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430 FORSTER SUli'!H,OO. CO. t·. COU:-;TY OF L. A. [::>4 C.2tl 
[L. A. No. 2ti668. III Bank. July 8, 1900.] 
FORSTER SIIIPBUITJDI?\G CO~rpAXY, INC. (a Corpora-
tion) et al., Appellants, Y. COF~;TY OF LOS ANGELES 
et al., Rcspomlcllts. 
[1] Taxation-Subjects of Taxation-Personal Property.--Lease-
hold interests in tax-exempt land are not "personal property" 
within the meaning of Const., art. XIII, § 14, dealing with 
assessment and taxation of per~oual property. 
[2] Id.-Subjects of Taxation-Possessory Interests.-Possessory 
interests in land are legislatively defincd as "real estate" or 
"real property" for purposes of taxation (Rcv. & Tax. Code, 
§§ 104, 106), and were so classified by judicial decision at the 
time of adoption of Con~t., art. XIII, § 14 (1933), dealing 
with assessment and taxatiun of personal property. 
[3] Constitutional Law - Construction of Constitutions. - Terms 
used in a constitutional amendmcnt must be construed in the 
light of their meaning- at the time of adoption of the amend-
ment and cannot be extended by legislative definition, since 
such extension would in effect be an amendment of the Con-
stitution if accepted as authoritative. 
[4] Taxation-Subjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-Const., 
art. XIII, § 9a, dealing with ull~e('urcd assessments of prop-
erties, as amended in 1936 to include the phrases "and assess-
ments upon possession of, claim to, or right to the possession 
of land and upon taxable improvements located on land exempt 
from taxation," indicates a change in the law and suggests 
that the newly specified interests were not within the purview 
of "per!lonal property" as used in the original provision, espe-
cially where the argument submitted to the voters in favor 
of the amendment stated that it would "simplify the collection 
on these property rights which the law says are real property 
hut which are not land." As used in Const., art. XIII, § ga, 
the term "personal property" therefore docs not include 
possessory interests in land; the same term has the sallle 
meaning in Const., art. XIII, § 14, dealing with assessment 
and taxation of personal property, since the two sections are 
in pari materia. 
[1] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 61 et seq.; Am.Jur., Taxation, 
§ 419 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 38, 46; Am.Jur., 
Constitutional Law, § 64 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,4-6,8] Taxation, § 43; [2, 9, 10, 14] 
Taxation, § 60; [3] Constitutional Law, § 28; [7] Taxation, § 44; 
[ 11-13] Courts, § 9-1. 
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[5] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-l:llder Const., 
art. XIII, § 14, the Legislature is authorized to classify per-
sonal property "in pursuance of the exercise" of its power to 
provide for the nssessment, levy and collection of taxes on 
all forms of tnngible personal property, certain specified types 
of intangibles, and any legal or equitable interest therein. It 
cannot be assumed that the provision authorizing classifiea-
tion was intended to be broader in scope than the power it 
was designed to implelllent. 
[6] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-Sinee lease-
hold interests in tax-exempt land are not tangible personal 
property, a specified type of intangible, or legal or equitable 
interests therein, they nre not within the power of classification 
set forth in Const., art. XIII, § 14. 
[7] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Intangible Property.-Intangibles 
other than those specified in the first clause of Const., art. XIII, 
§14, are immune from taxation. 
[8] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-Since lease-
hold interests in tax-exempt land are not "personal property" 
within the meaning of Const., art. XIII, § 14, the first para-
graph of Rev. & Tax. Code, § 107.1, stating that "A possessory 
interest, when arising out of a lease of exempt property, con-
sists of the lessee's interest under such lease and is hereby 
declared to be personal property within the meaning of Sec-
tion 14 of Article XIII of the Constitution" is invalid, but the 
elimination of that paragraph does not disturb the scheme 
of taxation set forth in the remaining paragraphs of § 107.1. 
[9] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Possessory lnterests.-Rev. & Tax. 
Code, § 107.1, dealing with taxation of possessory interests 
arising out of 8. lease of exempt property, cannot be sustained 
as a legislative interpretation of "full cash value" and "value," 
there being no suggestion of a legislative finding that a dis-
tinction as to substantial differenees in the value of possessory 
interests in tax-exempt property, as dependent on whether 
or not the interest was created, extended or renewed after a 
certain Supreme Court decision, reflected actual differences 
in the value of the interests involved. 
[10] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Possessory lnterests.-The sole 
purpose of Rev. & Tax. Code, § 107.1, dealing with taxation 
of possessory interests arising out of a lease of exempt prop-
erty, is to nlltigll.te the economic hurd ens imposed on lessees of 
tax-exempt property when the SllDreme Court overruled an 
earlier decision on the subject. 
[11] Courts-Decisions as Precedents-Retroactive Effeet 0.' lie-
parture.-Under traditional theory an overruled de~lI 1" 
[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, § 116 et seq.; Am.Jur., Courts, 
§ 44 et seq. 
4;;2 FOR.'iTER SHlI'I3LDO. Co. 1'. COU:-<Tl m' L. A. [54 C.2d 
considereu IIOt to have established bad law, but to have merely 
misstated the law. The overruling decision is deemed to state 
what the law was fr0111 the beginning, and is therefore generally 
given retroactive etIect. 
[12] Id.-Decisions as Precedents-Retroactive Effect of Depar-
ture.-The California Constitution permits an appellate court 
to apply nn overruling decision prospectively only, though it 
thereby temporarily preserves and applies a mistaken intcr-
pretation of the Constitution. 
[13] Id.-Decisions as Precedents-Retroactive Effect of Depar-
ture.-The constitutional requirements of assessment and tax-
ation at full value and in proportion to value are no less flexible 
than other constitutional provisions; neither provision pre-
cludes the temporary and limited application of a rule once 
approved by the Supreme Court, if reasonably designed to 
mitigate hardships caused by its subsequent rejection of the 
rule. Such temporary application of the rule of an overruled 
case may be prescribed by appropriate legislation as well ns 
by judicial decision, since the Legislature is no less compet('nt 
than the court to evaluate the hardships involved and decide 
whether considerations of fairness and public policy warrant 
the granting of relief. 
[14] Taxa.tion-Subjects of Taxation-Possessory Interests.-Rev. 
& Tax. Code, § 107.1, dealing with taxation of possessory inter-
ests arising out of a lease of exempt property, is not an un-
reasonable exercise of the Legislature's power to mitigate 
hardships caused by the overruling of established law. Rcntals 
in leases of tax exempt property created before an overruling 
Supreme Court decision were fixed at a level competitive with 
rentals of private property on the assumption that the rental 
value of the possessory interest would not be taxed, and the 
decision changing that rule imposed an unexpected tax burden 
on the lessees that their governmental lessors refused to miti-
gate by reducing rentals. Since adjustments in rentals under 
the code section can be made in leases created, extended or 
renewed after the Supreme Court decision, such lenses are 
properly excluded from the operation of the code section, the 
departure from assessment and taxation at full cash value 
and in proportion to value being no broader than the hardship 
to be remedied, and the last four paragrnphs of § 107.1 are 
valid, not being that type of discriminatory taxation that 
Const., art. XI, § 12, and art. XIII, § 1, were designed to 
prevent. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. George Francis, Judge.· Reversed with 
directions. 
* Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
) 
) 
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Action for taxes paid Ullder prott'st. Judglllt'nt for defend-
ants reversl'd with directions. 
Holbrook, Tarr & 0 'Neill, W. Sumner Holbrook, Jr., Francis 
H. 0 'Neill, 0 'Melveny & Myers, George F. Elmendorf, Ben-
nett W. Priest, Lillick, Geary, McHose, Roethke & Myers, 
John C. McHose, John F. O'Hara, Luce, Forward, Hamilton 
& Scripps, James O. Hewitt, Ralph D. Sweeney, Howard H. 
Taylor, J. Kerwin Rooney, Port Attorney (Oakland), and 
Robert G. Cockins, City Attorney (Santa Monica), for Ap-
pellants. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Alfred Charles 
DeFlon, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondents. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, James E. Sabine and Dan 
Kauffmann, Assistant Attorneys General, and Ernest P. 
Goodman, Deputy Attorney General, as Amiei Curiae on be-
half of Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-This appeal tests the constitutionality of 
seetion 107.1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, which pre-
scribes methods for evaluating the possessory interests of 
lessees of tax-exempt property. L. W. Blinn Lbr. 00. v. Oounty 
of Los Angeles, 216 Cal. 474 [14 P.2d 512], held that when 
such interests are evaluated by the capitalization of income 
method, deductions should be made from gross income for 
rentals to become due under the lease and for amortization 
of the cost of improvements by the lessee that would revert 
to the lessor. De Luz Homes, Inc. v. Oounty of San Diego, 
45 Cal.2d 546 [290 P.2d 544], overruled the Blinn case and 
held that under the capitalization of income method there 
can be no deductions for rental or amortization. Private 
lessees of government property under leases made prior to the 
De Luz decision complained that it was inequitable to apply 
the De Luz rule to them, since their rentals were fixed on the 
assumption that the rental value of the property would not 
be taxed. Apparently in response to such complaints the 
Legislature in 1957 adopted section 107.1 of the Revenue and 
Taxation Code, which provides: 
"A possessory interest, when arising out of a lease of exempt 
property, consists of the lessee's interest under such lease and 
is hereby declared to be personal property within the meanillg 
of Section 14 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the State 
of California. 
"The full cash value of such possessory iuterest is the excess, 
-!:>-1 FORSTI,:lt 8Illl'BLDG. Co. l'. Cou:-.;n· 01" fJ. A. 154 C.2d 
if ally, of t he value of tite kase on the 0lwn market, as deter· 
lIlilll'd hy til(' formula eOlltained in the' ease of De 1.11: Ilomes. 
Inc. Y. COllllt!J of Sail Diego (19;)5), 45 Cal.~tl 546 l2~)O P.~J 
544), ovel' the present worth of the rentals under said lease 
for the lllle'xpil'ed term thereof. 
"A possessory interest taxable under the provisions of this 
section shall be assessed to the h'ssee on the sallle basis or 
percentage of yaluation elllployed as to other tangible prop-
erty on the sallle roll. 
"This section applies only to possessory interests created 
prior to the date on which the decision of the California Su-
preme Court ill Dc Lu" IImncs, Inc, v. County of San Diego 
(1935), 45 Ca1.2d 546 [290 P.~d 544), became final. It does 
lIot, however, apply to any of such interests created prior to 
that date that thereafter have bl.'en, or may hereafter be, ex-
tended or 1'\'newed, irrespectiye of whether the renewal or 
extension is provided for in the instrument creating the 
iuterest. 
"This section does not apply to leasehold estateE for the 
production of gas, petroleum and other hydrocarbon substances 
from beneath the surface of the earth, and other rights re-
lating to such substances which constitute incorporeal heredita· 
ments or profits a prendre." 
Plaintiffs are lessees of certain lands and improvements 
owned by the city of Los Angeles and located within its bound-
aries. Their leases were made prior to the date on whieh our 
decision in the De Luz case became final and were not ex-
tended or renewed thereafter. Konetheless the assessor of Lo!'; 
Angeles County assessed their leasehold interests without 
deducting the present worth of rentals for the unexpired terms, 
on the ground that section 107.1 is void because inconsistent 
with section 1 of article XIII and section 12 of article X[ 
of the California Constitution. 
Plaintiffs appeared before the Los Angeles County Board 
of Equalization and applied for reduction of their assessments 
by such amounts as would result from the deduction of rentals 
pursuant to section 107.1. Upon denial of their applil'atioll 
they paid under protest the taxes levied for 1958 and insti-
tuted the present suit to recover the disputed amounts. The 
trial court found that section 107.1 is ullconstitutional and 
entered judgment for the defendants. 
Section 1 of article XIII of the California Constitution 
provides: "All property in the State except as otherwise in 
this COllstitut ion providf'd .. , shall be taxl'(l ill proportion 
July 1060] F(lRSTER SlIIl'P.LIXl. Co. 1'. CI)U:-;TY OF L. A. 4.).j 
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to its vulue, to be aseertaincd as provided by law ... ." Sedioll 
12 of artide XI provides: "All property subject to taxation 
shall be assessed for taxation at its full cash value." Plaintiff~, 
contend that the foregoing provisions arc not applicable to 
lL'asehold interests in tax-exempt property. They rely on the 
first paragmph of sed ion 107.1, which declares that sueh 
interests are "personal property" within the meaning of 
section 14 of article XIII. Section 14 provides: 
"The Legislature shall have the power to provide for the 
assessment, levy and collection of taxes upon all forms of 
tangible personal proprrty, all notes, debentures, shares of 
capital stock, bonds, solvcnt credits, deeds of trust, mortgages, 
and any legal or equitable interest therein, not exempt from 
taxation under the provisions of this Constitution, in such 
manner, and at such rates, as may be provided by law, and in 
pursuance of the exercise of such power the Legislature, 
two-thirds of all of the members elected to each of the two 
houses voting in favor thereof, may classify any and all kinds 
of personal property for the purposes of assessment and 
taxation ill a manner and at a rate or rates in proportion to 
value different from any other property in this State subject 
to taxation and may exempt entirely from taxation any or all 
forms, types or classes of prrsonal property." 
Plaintiffs contend that section 107.1 simply exercises the 
Legislature's power to classify "personal property" for the 
purposes of assessment and taxation in a manner and at a 
rate or rates different from other taxable property. 
[1] Leasehold interests in tax-exempt land, however, 
are not" personal property" within the meaning of section 14 
of article XIII. The relevant paragraph of section 14 was 
added to the California Constitution in 1933. At that time 
section 3617 of the Political Code provided: "The term' per-
sonal property' includes everythin~ which is the subject of 
ownership not in<:luded within the meaning of the term 'real 
estate' or 'improvements.' " The samc section provided: "The 
term 'real estate' includrs: 1. The possession of, claim to, 
ownership of, or right to the possession of land .... " [2] Pos-
sessory interests in lanu had bern legislatively defined as 
"rral estate" or "real proprrty" for purposes of taxation 
since 1872 and are still so defined today. (Rey. & Tax. Code, 
§§ 104, 106.) This court prior to 1933 had specifically rec-
ognized that poss(' . ,sory interests ill tax-('xpmpt laud are real 
property for purposes of taxatioll. (Sail Pedro rtc. R.R. Co. 
v. City of [,os AIIUd('s, 180 Cal. 18, 20-21 [179 P. :1!"l31 ; see 
J~)(j POR.':';'f1m SIlII'BLI)(1. CO. I'. ('OU:";'!'l OF h A. 154 C.2d 
Bukl'l'sjicld etc. Co. v. ItCl'1£ Coullly, 1-1'* Cal. 148, 152-13;~ 
l77 1'. 8a2J.) Thu:; at the time :;edioll 14 of ariiele XIII was 
adopted possessory iuterests in land, inl'ludillg lea:;ehold inter-
ests in tax-exempt land, had long been expressly elas>;ified by 
both statute and judicial dl'cisioll as real property for pur-
poses of taxation. [3] Terms used in a constitutional 
amendment" must be construed in the light of thrir llleallin~ 
at the time of the adnpliull of the amenlllllt'nt, and call not be 
extended by legislati\'e uefinitioll, for >;ueh extension would. 
in effect, be an amendment of the constitution, if accepted as 
authoritative." (Pacific G. & E. CO. Y. Industrial Ace. Com., 
180 Cal. 4a7, .:iOO [181 p, 788J.) 
[4] The interpretation given to the term "personal 
property" as used in section !)a of article XIII supports tIl(' 
conclusion that possessory interests in land are real property 
for purposes of taxation. That section originally read: "The 
taxes levied upon personal property for allY current tax year 
where the same is not secured by real estate shall be based .... " 
In 1936 the section was amended to read: "The taxes levied 
for any current tax year upon personal property and assess-
ments upon possession of, claim to, or right to the possession 
of land and upon taxable improvements located on land exempt 
from taxation, which are not a lien upon land sufficient in 
value to secure their payment, shall be based .... " (Italics 
added.) The insertion of the new phrases indicates a change 
in the law (IJyatt v. Allen, 54 Cal. 353, 336; Hammond v. 
McDonald, 49 Cal.App.2d 671, 681 [122 P.2d 332]) and sug-
gests that the newly specified interests were not within tIll' 
Jlurview of "personal property" as used in the original pro-
vision. Moreover, the argument submitted to the voters in 
favor of the amendment state<l that it would "simplify the 
collection of taxes on these property rights wh£ch the law says 
are real property but whieh are not Jan(l. ... " (Italics added.) 
As used in section 9a of article XIII, therefore, the term "per-
sonal property" does not include possessory interests in lan(l. 
The same term has the same meaning in section 14 of artiele 
XIII, sinee the two sections are in pari matcri(l. 
Textual analysis of section 14 suggests the sallle result. 
[5] The Legislature is authorize<l to classify personal prop-
I'rty "in pursuance of the exercise of" its power to provid,' 
for the assessment. levy, and collection of taxes upon all forms 
of tangible personal property, errtain specified types of in-
tallgibles, and any legal or eqnitabl!' iutC'rest til\' 1'!'iII. It cannot 
hc asslIm!'d that the provision anthorizing ,·lassifi,'atioTl was 
) 
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intrnded to he hl'oHlh'r ill scope than the powC'l' that it \Va', 
designed to imph·mellt. (Ro(,/II/! \'. County of Orange, 32 Cal. 
~d 280, 285 [196 P .2<1 350].) [ 6 ] Sinee leasehold j I1teresl'; 
ill tax-exempt land are not tangible personal propert~·, a i· 
specified type of intangible, or legal or equitable interests 
therein, they are not within the power of classification set 
forth ill section 14. 
[7] Moreover, we have held that intangibles other than 
those specified ill the first clause of section 14 are immune 
from taxation. (Roehm v. Coullty of Orailge, 32 Ca1.2d 280, 
~85 [196 P.2d 550].) If leasehold interests in tax-exempt 
land were "personal property," as the first paragraph of 
section 107.1 purports to declare, they would apparently be 
intangibles other than those specified in section 14 and e011se-
quC'ntly the remaining paragraphs of section 107.1 would bC' 
void. Thus deference to the legislative interpretation of the 
term" personal property," even if otherwise justifiable, would 
only defeat the broader legislative purpose to tax leasehold 
interests ill tax-exempt land. 
[8] For the foregoing reasons we hold that leaseholfl 
interests in tax-exempt land are not "personal property" 
within the meaning of section 14 of artiele XIII and that the 
first paragraph of section 107.1 of the Revenue and Taxation 
Code is invalid. '1'he elimination of that paragraph, howe"er, 
in no way disturbs the scheme of taxation set forth in the 
remaining paragraphs of section 107.1. Even though not a 
classification of "personal property," the remaining para· 
graphs must be sustained if they can be reconciled with the 
provisions of section 1 of article XIII and section 12 of artiele 
XI on some other grounds. (See People v. McCaughan, 49 
Ca1.2d 409, 416 [317 P.2d 974] ; Danskin v. Ban Diego Uni· 
fied Belt. Dist., 28 Ca1.2d 536, 554-555 [171 P.2d 885] ; People 
v. Lewis, 13 Ca1.2d 280, 284 [89 P.2d 388].) 
[ 9] Plaintiffs contend that the remaining paragraphs of 
section 107.1 do not violate the constitutional requirements 
that all property be assessed and taxI'd "at its full cash value" 
and "in proportion to its value," but merely prescribe a 
method of determining the "full eash valne" and "value" of 
a unique type of property, This method of determining valne 
was held improper ill the De Luz ('ase, but plaintiffs maintain 
that that case -.vas based upon a construction of "full cal\h 
value" as used in the applic'able statutes rather than in the 
Constitution. 'Ve (lo not, however, reach the question 0 1' 
whether De IJuz dl'l'lared a statutory or a constitutional ruh-. 
4c;j8 Fo~'n;R SUlI'BLDG. Co. t'. C'OU::\"Tl OF L. A. [34 C.2<1 
Undcr ,,('dion 107.1 slIhstantial dil1'('I'OI('(':> in the valuatioll 
of poss('ssory il1tc1"('sts ill tax.-exelllpt property tnl'n solely 
on whether or 110t tile intt'l'l·~,t was crcated, extcuded, or re-
newed after the De IJuz ul'ci"iou. In making this distitH:tioll 
the Legislature rel;t('<1 squarely, though mistakenly, on its 
power to classify "personal propl'rt~-." There is no sug-
gestion of a h'gislative finding that the distinetion refiec'is 
actual differences in the valne of the interests involved, al1(l 
no such finding could reasonably be ma(le. The seetion thert'-
fore cannot be sustained as a lcgi,;lati\'e interpretation of 
"full cash value" and" value." (See Eisley v. Mohan, 31 
Cal. 2d 637, 643 [H)2 P.2d 3].) 
Section 107.1 partially reinstat('s the rule of the Blinn ca,;e 
as the method for assessing and taxing interests created in 
reliance ou that rule, "'hilc pr('sl'l'\'illg the rule of the Dc Luz 
case for all other interests. [10] The sole purpose of the 
section is to mitigate the cconomic bUl'llens imposcu on lessees 
of tax-exempt property when this court overruled the BlinIl 
case. The basic issues presented, therefore, arc whether the 
Legislature has the power to drpart from assessment and tax-
atioIl at full cash value and in proportion to value by pre-
scribing temporary application, of a principle onee approved 
by this court, in order to miti~ate hardships caused by our 
subsequent rejection of that principle, and, if so, whether 
section 107.1 is a proper exercise of the power. 
I n recent years much attention has been given to the prob-
lem of mitigating the hardships caused by an overruling of 
established law. (See e.g., Freeman, Retroactice Operation 0/ 
an Over'ruling Decision, 18 Columb.L.Rev. 230; Kocourek &; 
Koven, Stare Decisl:s, 29 Ill.L.Rev. 971; von l\1oschzisker, Stare 
Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 409; Snyuer, 
Retrospective Operation of Overrllling Decisions, 35 ] 1l.L.Rey. 
121; Spruill, The Effect of an OvuJ"uling Decision, 18 N.C.h 
Hev. 199; 13 Mont.L.Rev. 74.) [11] Under traditional 
theory an overruled decision is considered not to have estab-
lished bad law, but to have merely misstated the law. The 
overruling decision is deemed to state what the law was from 
the beginning, and is therefore g-enerally giwlI retroactiv(' 
effect. (Collnty of Los Angeles v. PailS, 48 Ca1.2d 672,680-681 
[312 P.2d 680].) III most jurisdidiuns, however, courts have 
established exeeptions to the general rnle of retroadivity to 
protect those who acted in r('liance 011 the overruled dt·eisiotl. 
(See 21 C .. T.S. § 194, pp. 326-330, and eascs there t' ited.) Tit·· 
Supreme COUl·t of the l'nited States has held that the 'C'ni(pd 
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States Constitution Joes not compel retroactive applieation 
of overruling decisions. "A state in defining the limits of 
adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself betwerll 
the principle of forward operation and that of relation bat\,-
,,,a rd. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though 
later ovcl'l'ulrd, are law none the lcss for intermediate trans-
actions ... wheneYer injustice or hardship will thereby be 
averted." (Great Xorthern Ry. CO. Y. Sunburst Oil &; Refinillg 
Co" 287 U.S. 358, 364 [53 S,Ct. 145, 77 L,Ed. 360, 85 A.L.R. 
254].) State courts have grnerally found state constitutions 
equally permissive and have frequently stateJ that the deeision 
whether to apply an overruling decision retroactively or pros-
pectively only turns Oil considerations of fairness and public 
policy. (E.g., Arizona State Tax CO;)lIl1ission v. ElIsign, 75 
Ariz. 220 [254 P.2d 1029] and 75 Ariz. 376 [257 P.2d 392] ; 
State Y. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 51:t 517-518 [126 XW. 454, 455, 
Ann.Cas, 1912B 691. 33 L,R.A, ~.S. 788] ; P(,ople ex reI. Rice 
v. Graves, 242 App,Di,'. 128 [27:3 N.Y.S. 582, 587], aff'd. 270 
N.Y. 498 [200 N.E. 288], cert. denied, 298 U.S. 683 [56 S.Ct. 
!.l53, 80 L.Ed. 1403] ; see Menoes v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 [75 
Am.Dee. 616] ; Snydrr, Retrospcctive Opfration of Oven'1ITil/O 
Decisions, 35 Ill.L.Rey. 121, 140, and cases there cited.) 
[12] We have hitherto recognized that the California 
Constitution permits an appellate rourt to apply an overruling 
decision prospectively only, even though it thereby temporarily 
preserves and applies a mistaken intcrpretation of the COll-
stitution. (County of Los Angeles v. FallS, 48 Ca1.2d 672, 
681 [312 P.2d 680].) [13] The constitutional requir('ments 
of assessment and taxation at full eash value and in proportion 
to value are no less flexible in this respect than other consti-
tutional provisions. Neither provision precludes the temporary 
and limited application of a rule once approved by this court, 
if reasonably designed to mitigate hardships eaused by our 
subsequent rejection of the rule. Such temporary application 
of the rule of an overruled case may be prescribed by appro-
priate legislation as well as by judirial decision, for the Leg-
islature is no less competent than the court to evaluate the 
hardships involved and decide whether considerations of fair-
llegS and public policy warrant the granting of relief. 
[14] Section 107.1 is not an unl'pasonable exercise of the 
Legislature's power to mitil!1lte hardships ('auspd by the Over-
ruling of established law. HClltals in leases of tax-exempt 
property created before the De Lu7. ease were fixed at a level 
competitive with rentals of private property 011 the assumption 
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that the rental value of the possessory interest would Hot be 
taxed. The De Luz case imposed an unexpected tax burdcn on 
the lessees that their governmental lessors refused to mitigatl! 
by reducing rentals, on the ground that such reductions would 
constitute unconstitutional gifts of public funds. (Sec Cal. 
Const., art. IV, § 31; Texa.s Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 
52 Ca1.2d 55, 66 l338 P.2d 440] ; Conlin v. Board of Snper-
visors, 99 Cal. 17, 21-22 [33 P. 753, 37 Am.St.Rep. 17, 21 
L.R.A. 474] ; County of Alameda v. Chambers, 35 Cal.App. 
537, 545 [170 P. 650].) The lessees were therefore required 
to pay both rentals equivalent to rentals of private property 
and taxes to which lessees of private property are not subject 
because the full value of private property is taxed to the lessor. 
Since ndjustmentsin rentals can be made in leases created, 
cxtended, or renewed after the De Luz case, such leases are 
properly excluded from the operation of the section. The de-
parture from assessment and taxation at full cash value and 
in proportion to value is therefore 110 broader than the hard-
ship to be remedied. It is clearly not the type of discriminatory 
taxation that section 1 of article XIII alld section 12 of article 
XI were designed to prevent. 
Nothing in Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Ca1.2d 
35, 64-65 [338 P.2d 440], is inconsistent with the views ex-
pressed herein. In that case we considered merely the applic-
ability of the judicially developed rule set forth in Oonnty 
of Los Angeles v. Falls, 48 Cal.2d 672, 681 [312 P.2d 680]. 
Neither the Faus rule nor our opinion in the Texas Company 
case reflects constitutional limitations on when the type of 
relief provided by section 107.1 may be given. 
We hold, therefore, that the last four paragraphs of section 
107.1 are valid and that plaintiffs are entitled to recover thl' 
excess of the taxes paid under protest over the amounts that 
would have been levied if the assessor had complied with 
section 107.1. 
The judgment is reversed and, pursuant to stipulation b~' 
counsel, the trial court is directed to remand the case to the 
Los Angeles County Board of Equalization for hearing upon 
the matter of assessing plaintiffs' possessory interests accord-
ing to the terms ofsection.107.1 of the Revenue and Taxation 
Code. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, "'., concurred. 
